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SOVEREIGNTY, TRADE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT - THE
NORTH AMERICAN AGREEMENT ON ENVIRONMENTAL
COOPERATION
Sarah Richardson
This Article explores in a preliminary fashion ways in which the North
American Agreement for Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC)I impacts the
sovereignty of its Parties - the governments of Canada, Mexico, and the
United States. It will not explore the nature of sovereignty in detail. Rather, it
will consider any legally binding commitments in the NAAEC as well as the
changing patterns of behavior brought about by a commitment to cooperate
on a wide range of issues. It will consider the extent to which by entering
into the NAAEC and beginning to consider North America as a community
within the Commission for Environmental Cooperation (CEC), the countries
of North America have restricted their own autonomy and have put in place a
framework for cooperation that promotes accountability and encourages en-
vironmentally responsible behavior. This Article will also consider how the
NAAEC, a regional environmental agreement, constrains national govern-
ments in ways that are quite distinct from the constraints on national behav-
ior embodied in comprehensive regional trade liberalization agreements such
as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).2
The NAAEC does not attempt to set out common rules on substantive
environmental issues to govern the North American environment or make as
its focus the development of a supranational international organization. It
does, however, represent an acknowledgement of the environmental interde-
pendence of the countries of North America in the context of their economic
interdependence, and the need to approach those common environmental
issues in a cooperative manner. NAFTA addresses issues of economic inter-
dependence in a very different and ultimately more legally binding way.
* Sarah Richardson is the Program Manager, NAFTA/Environment, at the Commission
for Environmental Cooperation in Montreal, Quebec. The views expressed in this Article are
those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the Commission for
Environmental Cooperation or the Governments of Canada, Mexico, or the United States. The
author wishes to thank John Kirton, Linda Duncan, and Carla Sbert for their thoughtful
comments
I North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, Sept. 8, 1993,
Canada/Mexico/United States, 32 I.L.M. 1480.
2 North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 8, 1992, Canada/Mexico/United States,
32 I.L.M. 289.
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The NAAEC has its most constraining effects on national governments
through practice and observed behavior brought about by efforts to reach
consensus and the adoption of procedures relying on public participation and
requiring transparency. However, influencing the behavior of governments is
not the same as constraining the sovereignty of states. Some commentators
would argue that the NAAEC, with its emphasis on mandating the domestic
enforcement of domestic environmental law as opposed to promoting- har-
monization among the three Parties, actually strengthens national sover-
eignty.3 This Article will explore these arguments.
I. SOVEREIGNTY AND INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS
Sovereignty denotes the legal personality of a state in public international
law. Being sovereign and equal to others, a state has certain rights and corre-
sponding duties. These rights include exclusive control over its territory, its
permanent population, and other aspects of its domestic affairs. The associ-
ated duty is one not to intervene in the affairs of other states and thus not to
interfere with their exclusive jurisdiction.
Sovereignty is affected by international agreements and organizations to
varying degrees. Sovereignty determines that a nation has exclusive control
over its territory, its population, and its domestic affairs. However, states
acting together through negotiated legal instruments can accede sovereignty
over specified issues to a supranational institution where there is some recip-
rocal benefit to so doing. Also through negotiated agreements, states can
agree to relinquish exclusive jurisdiction over certain issues, or sets of issues,
with universal appeal through cooperative mechanisms. Thus the principle of
cooperation denies to some extent the exclusiveness of states' rights. Indeed,
if the interdependent nature of an issue is acknowledged by states and a re-
gime for management of that issue becomes a joint one, this, by definition,
denies exclusivity.
Since the 1940s, states have determined that it is in their best interests to
open their borders through progressive rounds of trade liberalization negotia-
tions. Thus, a number of trade liberalization agreements and regimes have
been established that codify the rules of trade and in so doing provide cer-
tainty and predictability to trading relationships. Yet, in receiving the bene-
fits of liberalized trade - the guarantee that one country's goods will be able
to compete without discrimination in foreign markets - one must clearly pro-
vide the corresponding legal guarantee to that foreign country to allow its
3 Daniel C. Esty & Damien Geradin, Market Access, Competitiveness and Harmon-
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goods to enter one's own market without discrimination. Thus, the rules at
shared borders are jointly agreed upon. Should those rules be violated, states
have access to dispute settlement processes under the trading regimes
equipped to issue binding decisions. Such is the case with the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the World Trade Organization
(WTO), the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement, and the North
American Free Trade Agreement.
Since the 1970s, sovereign states have come to recognize that an in-
creasing number of environmental issues cannot be dealt with effectively at a
national level. Rather, the realization has emerged that some environmental
issues embodied the universal concerns that were the underpinning of an
international society and therefore required multilateral cooperative action.
Thus, cooperative agreements are based upon the environmental interde-
pendence of states, their reliance on common resources, their shared steward-
ship over migratory species, and the recognition that there is a unity of pur-
pose in protecting a global or regional environment.4
In 1972, the Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment consid-
ered the need for a common outlook and for common principles to inspire
and guide the peoples of the world in the preservation and enhancement of
the human environment. Among the principles set out in the Stockholm
Declaration, two in particular address the issue of the rights and responsibili-
ties of states with respect to each other.
Principle 21
States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations
and the principles of international law, the sovereign right to exploit
their own resources pursuant to their own environmental policies,
and the responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction
or control do not cause damage to the environment of other States or
to areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.
Principle 24
International matters concerning the protection and improvement of
the environment should be handled in a cooperative spirit by all
countries, big or small, on an equal footing. Cooperation through
multilateral or bilateral arrangements or other appropriate means is
4 For a general discussion, see HUGH M. KINDRED ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW CHIEFLY
AS INTERRETED AND APPLED IN CANADA (820) (Emond Montgomery Publications Ltd.,1987).
1 U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 48/14 (1972), 11 LL.M. 1416. From the U.N. Conference on the
Human Environment (June 5-16, 1972).
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essential to prevent, reduce or eliminate adverse environmental ef-
fects resulting from activities conduced in all spheres, in such a way
that due account is taken of the sovereignty and interests of all
States.
6
Such an approach meant that, increasingly, global environmental issues have
been dealt with at an international level in fora such as the United Nations or
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).7
Following Stockholm, select international issues were addressed through
multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) beginning in 1973 with the
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and
Flora (CITES).8 Additional attempts to broaden the international legal regime
for global environmental issues include the conclusion of the Montreal Pro-
tocol 9 and the Basel Convention.' 0 Most recently, the United Nations Confer-
ence on Environment and Development held in June 1992, resulted in the Rio
Declaration," a set of non-binding principles, as well as the U.N. Convention
on Biodiversity,I2 and the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, 3
which has since been enhanced by the Kyoto Protocol.
14
Thus, by the 1970s the international environmental regime had begun to
recognize basic issues that had been adopted by the trade community decades
earlier. Just as countries that sign trade agreements at their discretion suspend
some sovereignty in order to gain the benefit that they will then receive by
being part of a rules-governed international trading bloc, the same thing oc-
curs in the environmental field. However, the terms of the agreements that
address environmental issues ensure that the suspension of sovereignty does
not occur to the same extent.
The existence of international organizations and cooperative international
agreements is a recognition of the need for the continuous, rules-based, inter-
governmental cooperation to achieve ends that independent states cannot
accomplish for themselves individually. They include a strong role for the
6 Id.
7 The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) was created by the U.N. General
Assembly in December, 1972.
8 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora,
Mar. 3, 1973,27 U.S.T. 1087, T.I.A.S. No. 8249, 993 U.N.T.S. 243, ELR Stat. 40336.
9 Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987, 26
IL.M. 1541.
10 Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and
Their Disposal, Mar. 22, 1989, art. 4(5), 28 I.L.M. 649.
1 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, June 14, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 874.
12 Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 818.
13 Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 849.
14 U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Dec. 10, 1997, 37 l.L.M. 22.
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nation state as the organization and political authority behind the collective
action. International institutions that promote cooperation can thus enhance
sovereignty by providing national governments with added instruments to
implement and enforce law, to develop capacity, and to otherwise meet the
needs of their citizens. Indeed, through cooperation with a bordering nation,
a state can arguably extend its jurisdiction by the ascendance of other states
to its domestic agenda.
II. NAFrA's ENVIRONMENTAL PROVISIONS
The "NAFTA debate" as it related to the environment, centered on a few
key issues.15 One was the creation of pollution havens. It was thought by
some that economic integration among the three countries of North America
would result in the migration of businesses to areas where environmental
standards were lower, or were perceived to be lower, thereby creating so-
called "pollution havens." A second issue was that regional integration would
encourage a so-called "race to the bottom" with respect to environmental
standards. It was thought by some that the countries of North America would
be encouraged to lower their environmental standards or cease enforcing
environmental laws in order to attract industry or enhance the competitive-
ness of their existing industry. A third issue was concern about increased
cross-border pollution. Finally, there were concerns that trade-related provi-
sions in multilateral environmental agreements could be challenged under
NAFrA.
Given these concerns, the negotiators of NAFTA were the first trade ne-
gotiators to take environmental issues into account during trade negotiations.
NAFTA, as it was negotiated, was characterized by many as the "greenest"
trade agreement ever. From the perspective of mandatory environmental be-
havior, however, there is little in the NAFTA that forces the behavior of nations
in their approach to environmental issues.
NAFTA includes perambulatory provisions recognizing the importance
of sustainable development and encouraging the effective enforcement of
15 For more complete discussions of the negotiation of the NAAEC and for perspectives
on the underlying reasons for the Agreement, see JoHN J. AUDLEY, GREEN POLITICS AND
GLOBAL TRADE: NAFTA AND THE FUTURE OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS (Georgetown
University Press, 1997); Sarah Richardson & Andr6 Beaulieu, The North American Agreement
on Environmental Cooperation: A Canadian Perspective, in NAFTA AND THE ENVIRONMENT,
(Seymour J. Rubin & Dean C. Alexander, eds., Kluwer Law Int'l 1996); PIERRE MARC
JOHNSON & ANDRE BEAULIEU, THE ENVIRONMENT AND NAFTA: UNDERSTANDING AND
IMPLEMENTINGTHE NEW CONTINENTAL LAW (Island Press, 1996); Don Munton & John Kirton,
North American Environmental Cooperation: Bilateral, Trilateral, Multilateral, in NORTH
AMERICAN OUTLOOK 59-86, (Mar. 1994).
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environmental law1 6 However, these provisions have no force in law and are
not referred to in the body of the NAFFA agreement. Article 1114 in the
investment chapter of NAFtA includes a normative restraint indicating that a
Party should not lower its environmental standards in order to attract invest-
ment. However, there is no absolute prohibition against such behavior and no
legal remedy beyond government-to-government consultation against a Party
that engages in it. 17 Article 104 of NAFTA protects listed MEAs that include
trade-restrictive provisions from challenge under the provisions of the trade
agreement. 18 Among the multilateral environmental agreements currently
listed are the Montreal Protocol, CITES, and the Basel Convention. This
affirms the supremacy of the trade-restricting provisions in those three inter-
national agreements. However, in the domain of their economic relations, the
three Parties have subscribed to common rules and dispute settlement re-
gimes for trade and investment in goods and services in the broadest trade
agreement in history. Moreover, there are no provisions in the NAFTA that
mandate or even encourage public participation and transparency. Thus, there
is no mechanism for public accountability or avenues forre Tus, to en-
courage environmentally enhancing behavior.
The NAFA, as it was negotiated in 1992, did little to ensure that coun-
tries enforce their environmental laws or to address the issue of increased
pollution brought about by increased economic activity that could accom-
pany trade. That is understandable; after all, NAFrA is a trade liberalization
agreement. However, during the autumn of 1992 in the context of the U.S.
presidential campaign, NAFTA's impacts on both labor and the environment
became critical issues. In a speech on October 4, 1992, Governor Bill Clinton
endorsed a supplemental agreement on the environment that created a Commis-
sion "with teeth" in the form of enforcement powers, moving its scope beyond
the cooperative arrangement originally contemplated.
19
During the negotiation of the "environmental side agreement," the issue
of sovereignty was discussed. It was relatively unproblematic to ensure that alarge part of the agreement was based on trilateral cooperation to address
environmental issues of common concern to North America as a region.
However, the debate over sovereignty was particularly heated in considering
the "teeth" that might be appropriate to ensure that the Parties would enforce
their domestic environmental law, such as the suspension of NAFTA benefits
through the imposition of trade sanctions against an offending Party.
16 NAFTA, supra note 2, at preamble, art. l(b).
17 NAFTA, art. 1114.
18 NAFTA, art. 104.
19 Expanding Trade and Creating American Jobs, Remarks of Gov. William J. Clinton at
North Carolina State University, Oct. 4, 1992.
[Vol. 24:183 1998
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mH. IMPLICATIONS OF THE NAAEC ON SOVEREIGNTY
The North American Agreement for Environmental Cooperation is the
"environmental side agreement" passed alongside the NAFTA.20 Both
agreements have as their Parties Canada, Mexico, and the United States.
Both agreements came into force on January 1, 1994. The NAAEC was con-
ceived to address two key issues raised in the debates that occurred during
the negotiation of NAFTA and the possible impacts of that trade liberaliza-
tion agreement on the environment. Those issues were the need for regional
cooperation on environmental issues of concern to North Americans and the
need to enhance the effective enforcement of environmental laws in all three
countries in order to protect the environment thereby ensuring a level playing
field for increased trade and investment in North America.
In its Preamble, the NAAEC reaffirms the Parties commitment to the
Stockholm Declaration of 1972 and the Rio Declaration on Environment and
Development in 1992, thereby confirming their support of the universality of
environmental issues and issues of sustainable development. It also reaf-
firms:
The sovereign right of States to exploit their own resources pursuant
to their own environmental and development policies and their re-
sponsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or con-
trol do not cause damage to the environment of other States or of ar-
eas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.. .21
There are three broad areas of the agreement to consider further in a dis-
cussion of sovereignty and how it is impacted by cooperative regimes such as
the one created by the NAAEC. The first is through the obligations of the
Parties under the Agreement. The second is through the institutional frame-
work set up in North America to implement the Agreement. And the third is
through the annual work program and budget developed under the coopera-
tive provisions of the Agreement.
A. The Obligations of the Parties
The term "Parties" in the NAAEC is understood to include the various
departments, ministries, or agencies that make up the governments of Can-
ada, Mexico, and the United States, including provinces and states. 22 The
20 For a recent discussion on the CEC, see John Kirton, NAFTA's Commission for
Environmental Cooperation and Canada-U.S. Relations, in 27 AM. REv. CAN. STUDIES 459-
.86(1997).
21 NAAEC, preamble, supra note 1, at 1482.
In Canada this is subject to the Canadian provinces acceding to the NAAEC.
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obligations of the Parties are contained in Part Two of the NAAEC. These
are the obligations of the governments generally, and the relevant depart-
ments with jurisdiction over issues ranging from fisheries and lands to jus-
tice, trade, commerce, foreign affairs, and state, among others.
General obligations of the Parties include the preparation of periodic re-
ports on the state of their national environments, the development and review
of environmental emergency preparedness measures, and the promotion of
environmental education. Further obligations include scientific research and
technology development in respect to environmental matters, the assessment
of environmental impacts, the promotion of the use of economic instruments
for the efficient achievement of environmental goals, and the consideration
of a prohibition on the export to the territories of the other Parties of a pesti-
cide or toxic substance whose use is prohibited within the Party's territory.23
Of particular importance for a discussion of the impacts of the North
American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation on the national sover-
eignty of its Parties is Article 3 as follows:
Recognizing the right of each Party to establish its own levels of
domestic environmental protection and environmental development
policies and priorities and to adopt or modify accordingly its envi-
ronmental laws or regulations, each Party shall ensure that its laws
and regulations provide for high levels of environmental protection
and shall strive to continue to improve those laws and regulations. 24
Article 3 thus mandates the Parties to ensure a high level of environ-
mental protection and strive to continue to improve those laws and regula-
tions. However, there is no definition of "high" and the Parties are required
only to "strive" to improve their environmental laws and regulations, thus
simply requiring best practices. Therefore, as a matter of law, national sover-
eignty is the dominant principle governing the behavior of the Parties and
further to Article 3 it is ultimately unaffected by the generally conceived
constraints to provide high levels of protection and to strive to continue to
improve those levels. So in signing the NAAEC, as a matter of law, no Party
has given up its sovereign right to set national environmental priorities, poli-
cies, laws, and regulations at a level that it alone determines. Furthermore,
there is no requirement that the three Parties shall, at present, or in the future,
harmonize any of their national laws or regulations to meet any trinational
standard.
23 NAAEC, supra note 1, at art. 2.
24 Id. at art. 3.
[Vol. 24.183 1998
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The Parties are also required by the Agreement to ensure that their laws,
regulations, procedures, and administrative rulings on areas covered in the
NAAEC are published. Moreover, they are required, "to the extent possible"
to publish in advance any proposed measures and to provide interested per-
sons and Parties a reasonable opportunity to comment on those proposed
measures.2 There is no threat to sovereignty in a requirement to publish do-
mestic legislation that is adopted. And, even in the event that a Party pub-
lishes proposed measures and asks for comments from the other Parties, there
is no requirement to take any comments received into account.
The Parties have also agreed to a common obligation to "effectively en-
force its environmental laws and regulations within its own territory through
appropriate governmental action," with the aim of achieving high levels of
environmental protection and compliance with its environmental laws and
regulations. The Parties have chosen to pursue this obligation through a
Council-created trilateral North American Working Group on Environmental
Enforcement and Compliance (EWG). The EWG focuses on enhancing link-
ages among North American Environmental and Wildlife Enforcement a 9en-
cies and exploring alternative approaches to addressing regional issues. It
serves as a North American forum to build regional networks and develop
strategies related to multilateral agreements such as CITES and the Basel
Convention. The EWG encourages regional efforts for developing environ-
mental enforcement capacity including training. It also provides a regional
policy forum for dialogue among national, state, and provincial environ-
mental and wildlife enforcement agencies regarding delivery of their respec-
tive domestic and international obligations. In this way, the obligations under
Article 5 to effectively enforce environmental laws are being addressed in a
trilateral fashion with the added capacity of the CEC as a facilitator. How-
ever, the EWG is not required by the text of the NAAEC. It is less a part of
the obligations of the Parties than it is a part of the cooperative framework
and incremental practice that the Council has chosen to implement the obli-
gations.
Under Article Six the Parties have agreed to ensure the existence of pri-
vate access to remedies. These provisions and the examples of remedies
listed in the article are crafted to guarantee such access in accordance with a
Party's law. Article Seven requires the Parties to provide to their publics pro-
25 Id. at art. 4.26Id. at art. 5.
27 For a detailed discussion of the CEC Enforcment Cooperation Program, see Linda F.
Duncan, The North American Agreement for Environmental Cooperation: A Regional
Framework for Effective Environmental Enforcement, Paper prepared for the Fifth
International Conference on Environmental Compliance and Enforcement, Nov. 16-20, 1998,
Monterey, California.
9
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cedural guarantees in its administrative, quasi-judicial, and judicial proceed-
ings.
The obligations of the Parties in Part Two of the NAAEC are essentially
neutral in their impact on sovereignty in the strict sense of the term. Obliga-
tions undertaken freely by governments to enforce and perhaps even
strengthen their own environmental laws, to let their citizens know what
those laws are, to provide their citizens with access to legal remedies and
procedural guarantees are not constraints on national sovereignty. Neverthe-
less, the existence of these obligations may well influence the behavior of the
Parties and add pressures for the cooperative allocation of resources towards
those specific provisions in the NAAEC.
B. Institutional Structures
The NAAEC was negotiated to address the key issues of enforcement and
cooperation on regional environmental issues. Thus, these areas comprise the
majority of the Agreement. This section will examine the Agreement's so-
called "teeth" in the context of the trilateral inter-governmental institution that it
created - the Commission for Environmental Cooperation (CEC). The CEC
itself has a single headquarters in Montreal, Canada. It is funded equally by the
three Parties at a cost of nine million dollars (U.S.), although the specific level
of funding is unspecified in the Agreement.28
The CEC has three principle components: the Council, the Secretariat,
and the Joint Public Advisory Committee (JPAC). The Council is comprised
of the three most senior environmental officials in each of the three
countries.29 The Council is the governing body of the Commission and as
such is assigned tasks including oversight of the Secretariat, the approval of
the annual work program and budget, and the development of recommenda-
tions on a number of important regional environmental issues.30 The Council
is also charged with cooperating with the NAFTA Free Trade Commission to
achieve the environmental goals and objectives of NAFTA.31 The Council is
required to meet once a year and is required to hold public meetings during
the course of its regular session.
32
2 NAAEC, supra note 1, at art. 43.
29 The Honorable Christine Stewart, Minister of the Environment in Canada; Julia
Carabias Lillo, Secretaria, Secretaria de Medio Ambiente, Recursos Naturales y Pesca in
Mexico; and, Carol Browner, Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency in the
United States.
30 NAAEC, supra note 1, at art. 10(1) and (2).
31 Id. at art. 10(6).
32 Id. at art. 9(3) and (4).
[Vol. 24.183 1998
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The second component of the CEC is the Secretariat. The Secretariat is
headed by an Executive Director, who is appointed jointly by the three gov-
ernments. It is the responsibility of the Executive Director to appoint and
supervise the professional staff that is recruited from the three NAFFA
countries.
The third component of the CEC is the Joint Public Advisory Committee
(JPA). The PAC is comprised of fifteen members, five appointed by each
Party. The PAC may provide advice to the Council on any matter within the
scope of the NAAEC. The PAC is required to meet at least once a year.
C. Submissions on Enforcement Matters
The Parties are not required to modify in any way their environmental
standards. One of the objectives of the Agreement is to "enhance compliance
with, and enforcement of, environmental laws and regulations." 34 To this
end, there exists a mechanism in the NAAEC whereby "any non-
governmental organization or person" may make a submission to the Secre-
tariat claiming that a Party "is failing to effectively enforce its environmental
law. 35 Taken together, Articles 14 and 15 of the NAAEC represent a critical
institutional mechanism to encourage the effective enforcement by the Par-
ties of their domestic environmental law. While these provisions have no de
jure impact on sovereignty, in practice this new trilateral regime has the po-
tential to influence a Party's behavior should it become the focus of such a
submission.
Provided that this complaint meets criteria set out in the Agreement, the
Secretariat can make a recommendation to the Council that it warrants the
36development of a factual record. The Council can direct the Secretariat to
go ahead with the development of a factual record by a two-thirds vote.
37
Once completed, the Secretariat submits the factual record to the Council and
the Council may, again by a two-thirds vote, decide to make that factual rec-
ord public.38 There is no further remedy for the submitter and no further duty
on the Party that was the subject of the factual record under this submission
process, notwithstanding the contents of the factual record.
33 Id. at art. 16.
34 Id. at art. Il(g).
35 Id. at art. 14(1). Procedures for filing complaints are set out in the NAAEC, and are
elaborated upon by Guidelines for Submission on Enforcement Matters under Articles 14 and
15 of the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation.
36 NAAEC, supra note 1,atart. 15(1).
37 Id. at art. 15(2).
38 Id. at art. 15(5) and (7).
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Thus, there is no ultimate overt challenge to national sovereignty inherent
in the citizens' submission process. However, Article 14 is a novel mecha-
nism in any international environmental or other agreement. It is innovative
in that it allows citizens to publicly seek accountability from the Parties for
alleged failure to enforce environmental laws and regulations in the three
countries. Moreover, it allows citizens of one country to submit allegations of
non-enforcement against any one of the three Parties. Thus, for the purpose
of promoting the effective enforcement of environmental law, the NAAEC
allows for the citizens of the three countries to behave as though they are
North American environmental citizens.
Furthermore, it allows for the governments to respond as a region. The
decisions about whether to pursue a factual record, and then whether to make
that factual record public are not decisions that need to be taken by consen-
sus. Thus, the Party that is the subject of the factual record can be overruled
by the other two Parties should the former not wish either to direct the devel-
opment of a factual record or allow for its public release. Once released to
the public, it is up to the submitters or the citizens of the region to bring pres-
sure to bear on their governments through existing democratic institutions of
government to encourage any action that addresses issues raised in the sub-
mission and the factual record. There is no trilateral mechanism to direct a
Party's behavior on these issues.
From January 1, 1994 to September, 1998 the CEC had received eighteen
submissions from citizens or non-governmental organizations under Article
14.39 Of these, seven disputes have been considered and dismissed by the
Secretariat for procedural reasons or because they were deemed not to fall
under the scope of Article 14. In previous rulings, it has been determined by
the Secretariat that Article 14 cannot be used in cases where, through the
democratic process, a Party has amended an environmental law and applies
only to administrative failure to enforce. In only two cases has the Secretariat
recommended to the Council that it prepare a factual record. In both cases
the Council has agreed by unanimous vote. The first of those factual records
was completed in early 1997 and the Council agreed to make it public by a
unanimous vote in June 1997.41 The second factual record is currently being
developed by the Secretariat.
39 See Registry of Submissions on Enforcement Matters at http://www.cec.org (last
visited Sept. 10, 1998).
40 SEM-96-001(Aug. 2, 1996) and SEM-97-001 (Council Resolution 98-07 dated June 24,
1998).
41 SEM-96-001, Final Factual Record of the Cruise Ship Pier Project in Cozumel,
Quintana Roo (Oct. 24, 1997).
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In keeping with the NAAEC's commitment to transparency, this mecha-
nism is an open one. A summary of each file is available to the public in
three languages in hard copy and on the Internet, and all of the documenta-
tion not designated as confidential regarding the submission review process
developed by the submitter, the Parties, and the Secretariat may be consulted
upon request.
The evidence in the decisions surrounding citizen submissions suggests
that sovereignty is secure. Early decisions suggest that the sovereign right of
a country to make or change laws through its national legislative process is
not subject to challenge. Nevertheless, despite the limitations in the scope of
Article 14, a pattern is beginning to emerge in its application and acceptance
by the Parties. It appears that the Parties are not prepared to object to the
review process or a Secretariat determination that is on the public record and
are not prepared, in the face of a two-thirds voting provision, to appear to be
undermining the mechanism that they themselves negotiated and agreed to in
1994.
D. Consultation and Resolution of Disputes
A second institutional vehicle to encourage effective enforcement in the
NAAEC is in Part V, which contains the provisions for Party-to-Party Con-
sultations and Dispute Resolution. Any Party may request consultations with
any other Party regarding whether there has been "a persistent pattern of fail-
ure by that other Party to effectively enforce its environmental law." 42 If con-
sultation does not solve the issues, then a special session of the Council can
be requested and failing solution through that means, any Party may request
an arbitral panel. The Council, by a two-thirds vote, may convene such a
panel to consider the matter:
... where the alleged persistent patterns of failure by the Party com-
plained against to effectively enforce its environment law relates to a
situation involving workplaces, firms, companies or sectors that pro-
duce goods or provide services:
(a) traded between the territories of the Parties; or
42 NAAEC, supra note 1, at art. 22.
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(b) that compete, in the territory of the Party complained against,
with goods or services produced or provided by persons of another
Party.
43
The Panel will produce an initial report that will contain findings of fact
as well as a determination by the panel as to whether there has been a persis-
tent pattern of failure to effectively enforce environmental law. If such a
finding is made, the Panel will propose an action plan to remedy the non-
enforcement. Following a comment period, the final report shall be published
five days after it is transmitted to the Council.
If the action plan is not adhered to, remedies include monetary assess-
ment (fines). 4 In the event that the monetary assessments are not paid, there
can, in the case of Mexico and the United States, be a suspension of benefits
under NAFIA in the sector affected by the determination.45 In Canada, the
Commission will file a copy of the panel determination in federal court to be
enforced through the domestic court system as an order of the court not sub-
ject to domestic review or appeal.46
Thus, there is a remedy if a government chooses to allege that another
government is not enforcing its environmental law. Part V of the NAAEC is
the dispute resolution procedure that includes legal "teeth" while the citizens'
submission process under Article 14 (as previously discussed) relies on the
power of persuasion, public participation, democracy, and accountability.
Where there are legal "teeth" in Part V, standing is granted only to a Party, as
opposed to any citizen. Where there are legal "teeth," the test is a "persistent
pattern of failure.., to effectively enforce" an environmental law that has an
impact on trade,47 as opposed to a simple "failure to effectively enforce an
environmental law" under Article 14.4 Where the agreement has "teeth" the
process involves an arbitral panel appointed by the governments as opposed
to a process left in the hands of the Secretariat. Part V has yet to be used. On
the other hand, despite its limitations in law, Article 14 is being used by the
citizens of North America.
E. The Cooperative Work Program
NAAEC provides the scope for the Council to cooperate on a broad range
of issues and the CEC's extensive cooperative work program constitutes the
43 Id. at art. 24.
44 Id. at art. 34(5)(b) and Annex 34.
45 Id. at art. 36 and Annex 36B.
Id. at Annex 36A.
47 NAAEC, supra note 1, at arts. 24(1) and 24(l)(a).
48 Id. atart. 14.
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majority of its work. The annual work program and budget is developed in
the first instance by the Secretariat and must ultimately be approved by con-
sensus by the Council.49 The structure of the CEC allows for the public provi-
sion of outside advice to the Council through the JPAC and domestic National
Advisory Committees on the annual program and budget. Such guarantees of
public input reflect the Parties' perambulatory affirmation of the importance of
public participation in conserving, protecting, and enhancing the environment.
Since 1995, a number of projects have been carried out under the annual
work program of the CEC within major areas of concern to the North Ameri-
can environment including biodiversity and ecosystems, pollutants and
health, enforcement cooperation and law, capacity building and education,
and environment, economy, and trade. Some projects assist the Parties to
develop common frameworks for joint action. For example, the sound man-
agement of the chemicals project is promoting actions to reduce, and then
phase out, the use of targeted chemicals in North America. The CEC devel-
ops and assists in the implementation of North American regional action
plans to do this. Plans are being implemented that cover dangerous sub-
stances such as DDT, cholordane, PCBs, and mercury and a number of addi-
tional substances are being considered for control. A second example of the
trilateral development of new instruments for environmental protection is
provided in Article 10(7). Article 10(7) mandates that the Council shall con-
sider and develop recommendations with respect to assessing the environ-
mental impact of proposed projects subject to decisions by a competent gov-
ernment authority and likely to cause significant adverse transboundary ef-
fects. The CEC is implementing this article by assisting the Parties in the
negotiation of a binding agreement on the environmental impact assessment
of transboundary undertakings.
Other projects focus on the collection, evaluation, and dissemination of
data and information. For example, in its project North American Pollutant
Release and Transfer Registry, the CEC monitors pollutant releases and
transfers in North America based on national reporting systems. This project
makes available in a trilateral publication information collected by the na-
tional governments on the pollutant releases of some of the most important
industries in the region.
The CEC also provides a forum for trilateral cooperation among officials
including officials in different disciplines and encourages dialogue between
49 The CEC's annual program and budget is a public document. All of the work of the
CEC is available, when it is in its final form on the Internet, free of charge, in the three
languages of the CEC-English, French, and Spanish. Thus, work undertaken under the
NAAEC is made available to the public fully responding to the NAAEC's calls for
transparency.
15
Richardson: Sovereignty, Trade, and the Environment--The North American Agree
Published by Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons, 1998
CANADA-UNITED STATES LAW JOURNAL
disparate communities. For example, the NAAEC encourages cooperation
between trade and environment officials.50 Article 10(6) is of particular note
in this discussion. It gives the Council the role in acting as a point of inquiry
for receipt of comments from non-governmental organizations and persons
concerning the goals and objectives of NAFTA. It also specifies that the
Council should provide assistance in consultations under NAFTA's Article
1114 and undertake an ongoing assessment of the environmental effects of
NAFTA. Thus, it provides a forum for cooperation on issues where trade and
the environment policies meet and, in particular, where they can produce
positive synergies. It also provides a public window on the normative con-
straints in NAFTA.
Other important capacity-building initiatives are being undertaken in
Mexico including cooperation on strengthening the environmental manage-
ment capacity in the State of Guanajuato and developing a Natural Protected
Areas System.
This cooperative agenda is not intended as a means to limit the sovereign
freedom of one nation to behave in any way that it wishes. Indeed, one could
argue that the exchange of information and capacity building strengthen the
Parties' individual ability to address environmental issues of importance to
their national affairs, their domestic environments, and their citizens. How-
ever, the mechanisms put in place under the agreement that direct the three
governments to work together and determine the manner in which they will
work together in a trilateral way, can impact on the decision-making dynam-
ics and influence decisions through the persuasion inherent in a trilateral,
consensus-driven process. Looking for trilateral consensus necessary for re-
gional cooperation on regional issues means that the focus of the CEC is not
necessarily on any one nation's domestic priorities.
IV. CONCLUSION
This preliminary exploration of ways in which the NAAEC impacts
the sovereignty of its Parties suggests that its most constraining elements are
the result of actual practice and not necessarily as a matter of law. While the
NAAEC rarely impacts the sovereignty of its Parties - after all they are ulti-
• - • . 51
mately free to withdraw from the Agreement with six months notice - it
appears to affect their behavior in a subtle way that relates to their commit-
ment to public participation, transparency, and commitment to cooperate by
consensus on issues where they have determined there is an overall benefit
for regional action. In the particular case of the NAAEC and the CEC, the
50 NAAEC, supra note 1, at art. 10(6).
51 Id. at art. 50.
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Parties relinquished very little through the development of common legal
rules or efforts to harmonize. Yet observed practice shows signs of changing
behavior and a regional approach to issues of common environmental con-
cem through institutional structures and process requirements that may not
exist in multilateral approaches.
From an environmental perspective, the regional environmental
agreements constrain sovereignty more than does the NAFTA, but the legal
rules in NAFTA that govern trade in North America ultimately have consid-
erably more of a constraining impact over the behavior of the three countries
and their sovereignty in the economic domain. This suggests that that states
are prepared to relinquish more control over their economic destiny with an
assurance that achieving the reciprocal benefits from their trading partners
will promote their own prosperity in ways that they could not do alone. A
similarly clear and forthright recognition of the mutual benefits embodied in
joint environmental protection and a similar rules-based system for the mul-
tilateral protection of the environment, paralleling the regime that governs
the multilateral trading system, has not been advocated by nations more
broadly. Indeed the value of the benefits of regional environmental protection
has not been fully accepted to the extent that states are willing to give up a
degree of sovereignty over their choices with respect to their domestic envi-
ronments, even in the most advanced regional arrangement such as that
which exists in North America that includes the NAFTA and the NAAEC.
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